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I.

INTRODUCTION

It has always seemed strange to me that in Illinois an insurer could
"honor" its duty to defend a policyholder (i.e. protect it from incurring
defense costs) by refusing to defend and then suing the policyholder for a
declaration that there is no duty to defend - thus imposing on the
policyholder a two-front war. Far from getting protection from litigation
costs, the policyholder must pay out of its own pocket to defend two
lawsuits.

* John S. Vishneski III, a Partner at Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP,
represents policyholders in complex insurance coverage cases and is a frequent commentator
on Illinois insurance law.
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Yet, this is precisely the impression an insurer might have from
reading the often-stated rule that, " '[w]hen a complaint against the insured
alleges facts within or potentially within the scope of the policy coverage,
the insurer taking the position that the complaint is not covered by the
policy must defend the suit under a reservation of rights or seek a
declaratory judgment that there is no coverage.' ' Insurers reason that as
long as they take one of these options (i.e. sue their insured), they have
followed Illinois law and cannot get into trouble. What insurers are
missing, however, is that the above-stated options relate only to the
question of whether they will be estopped from raising policy defenses to
coverage. The options noted above are part of a rule that - completely
stated - finishes with the sentence: "If the insurer fails to take either of
these actions, it will be estopped from later raising policy defenses to
coverage." 2
These options have nothing to do with whether an insurer must pay the
policyholder's defense costs while the insurer prosecutes its declaratory
judgment action. That issue turns on an entirely different rule - the rule
governing what triggers an insurer's duty to defend and when that duty is
triggered. That rule states: " 'An insurer may not justifiably refuse to
defend an action against its insured unless it is clear from the face of the
underlying complaints that the allegations fail to state facts which bring the
case within, orpotentially within, the policy's coverage.' ,3 " 'Whereas the
duty to indemnify can arise only after damages are fixed in their amount,
the duty to defend may arise as soon as damages are sought in some
amount.'
, "[T]he duty to defend flows in the first instance from the
allegations in the underlying complaint; this is the concern at the initial
stage of the proceedings when an insurance company encounters the
primary decision of whether to defend its insured.",5 Hence, the key
question is: What does it mean for the allegations of an underlying
complaint to come potentially within policy coverage at the time an
insurance company must determine whether to defend its policyholder?
Surprisingly, until quite recently, the Illinois Supreme Court has said
very little about this important topic. On March 24, 2005, however, the
1. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Martin, 710 N.E.2d 1228, 1230-31 (Ill. 1999)
(quoting Clemmons v. Travelers Ins. Co., 430 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (111. 1981)).
2.
Id. at 1231 (citing Clemmons, 430 N.E.2d at 1107).
3.
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 578 N.E.2d 926, 930 (Il1. 1991)
(quoting Conway v. Country Cas. Ins. Co., 442 N.E.2d 245, 247 (Ill. 1982)) (emphasis
added).
4.
Cent. Ill. Light Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 821 N.E.2d 206, 216 (Ill. 2004) (quoting
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Super. Ct., 16 P.3d 94, 102 (Cal. 2001))
(emphasis added).
5.
Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Envirodyne Eng'g., 461 N.E.2d 471, 473 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1983).
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Illinois Supreme Court broke its silence and brought much needed clarity to
this area of insurance law. As discussed below, in General Agents
Insurance Co. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co. ("Midwest Sporting
Goods"),6 the Illinois Supreme Court held that an insurer cannot determine
whether a complaint against its policyholder is potentially within coverage
retroactively by reference to the result of a declaratory judgment action.
Rather, that determination must be made by the insurer at the time it
reviews the complaint and makes a decision to defend or not to defend its
policyholder. 7
This critical ruling clarifies that under Illinois law insurers may not
impose a two-front war on their policyholders and takes away the unfair
leverage that the two-front war tactic provides insurers in settling claims.
Rather, as explained below, the necessary implication of Midwest Sporting
Goods is that, upon receiving a complaint against its policyholder, if the
insurer has doubts about coverage, it must: (i) defend its policyholder under
a reservation of rights; (ii) file a declaratory judgment action seeking a
judgment that it has no duty to defend AND pay the policyholder's defense
costs until a judgment is obtained; or (iii) refuse to defend and take its
chances that it will be estopped from raising policy defenses to any
judgment or settlement if it is wrong.
II.

WHEN DOES THE DUTY To DEFEND ARISE?
(AND WHEN DOES IT END?)

The duty to defend "may arise as soon as damages are sought [against
the policyholder] in some amount," 9 and "at the initial stage of the
proceedings when an insurance company encounters the primary decision
of whether to defend its insured."' Hence, an insurer's duty to defend
exists (or not) long before any court has a chance to consider whether that
duty exists. Consequently, if an insurer files a declaratory judgment action
and the judge declares that there is a duty to defend, it is clear at that point
that there has always been a duty to defend from the time the underlying
complaint was filed against the policyholder. The insurer must pay for
defense costs incurred by the policyholder from the inception of the
underlying suit. The opposite, however, is not true. If the judge in the
declaratory action determines that there is no duty to defend, it does not
necessarily follow that there has never been a duty to defend.
6.
828 N.E.2d 1092 (Ill. 2005).
7. See id.
8. Id.
9.
Cent. Ill. Light Co., 821 N.E.2d at 216 (quoting Certain Underwriters, 16 P.3d
at 102 (Cal. 2001)).
10.
Envirodyne Eng'g., 461 N.E.2d at 473.
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Long before Midwest Sporting Goods, Illinois courts recognized
circumstances in which an underlying complaint filed against a
policyholder came "potentially within" coverage - thus triggering the
insurer's duty to defend - but that the duty to defend could be cut-off by a
judicial declaration that eliminated the potential for coverage raised by the
underlying complaint. This is demonstrated by the rules that have
developed concerning the circumstance where an insurer wishes to deny a
defense on the basis of facts not alleged within the four comers of the
underlying complaint.
In Clemmons v. Travelers Insurance Co.," the Illinois Supreme Court
found that an insurer was required to defend a putative insured even though
the insurer possessed evidence that the putative insured was not an insured
under the policy. Anthony Clemmons sued Dennis Reed for negligently
injuring Clemmons in an automobile accident.' 2 Reed was a blood
distributor for the Red Cross and was driving a car owned by the Red Cross
when the accident occurred.1 3 Travelers insured the car and covered
persons driving the car with permission of the Red Cross. 14 Clemmons'
complaint said nothing about whether Reed was driving with permission
and, in fact, no issue in Clemmons' case turned on whether Reed had
permission.' 5 Travelers obtained an accident report indicating that Reed
was not driving with permission at the time of the accident and refused to7
defend.1 6 The court held that Travelers had wrongfully refused to defend'
because the complaint stated facts creating a potentialfor coverage under
the policy (i.e. Reed might have had permission).' 8 The court further held
that "the duty to defend must be determined solely from the language of the
complaint and the policy."' 9 In addition, the court noted that "[i]f Travelers
wanted to preserve its right to later contest permission, it had the choice of
defending under
a reservation of rights or seeking a declaratory judgment of
20
no coverage.,
Similarly, in Chandler v. Doherty,2' the insurer possessed strong
evidence that the putative insured's car was not covered by the insurance
policy. Otis Doherty owned one car insured by American Fire & Casualty
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

430 N.E.2d 1104(111. 1981).
Id. at 1106.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1107.
Clemmons, 430 N.E.2d at 1108.
Id.at 1111.
Id.at 1108.
Id.
Id. at 1109.
702 N.E.2d 634 (I11.App. Ct. 1998).
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Company ("American Fire") but received another car as a gift. 22 American
Fire did not insure the gift car until three months after Doherty got in an
accident with Verna Chandler.2 3 Chandler's complaint, however, stated
only that Doherty was driving "his motor vehicle. 24 American Fire refused
to defend because the gift car was not an insured vehicle at the time of the
accident. 25 The appellate court held that "American Fire had unjustifiably
refused to defend., 26 It found that Chandler's complaint created the
potentialfor coverage (i.e. "his motor vehicle" could have referred to the
covered car).27 The court further held that:
It is the law of this state that in determining whether it has
a duty to defend a suit, and insurer is limited to comparing
the bare allegations of the complaint with the face of the
policy of insurance... The duty to defend is not annulled
by the knowledge on the part of the insurer the allegations
are untrue or incorrect or the true facts will ultimately
exclude coverage.2 8
As in Clemmons, the Chandler court noted that American Fire could
have defended under a reservation of rights or filed a declaratory judgment
its right to argue that the gift car was not insured under
action to preserve
29
the policy.
The insurers in both Clemmons and Chandler failed to follow Illinois
and
paid the price. They were both held to have breached the duty to
law
defend and had to pay the insured's defense costs and the judgment against
the insured up to policy limits. 30 The lesson of these cases is that where a
complaint against the insured, on its face, raises the potentialfor indemnity
coverage, an insurer must defend its insured because the duty to defend is
broader than the duty to indemnify. 31 If the insurer wishes to cut-off that
duty to defend based on facts extrinsic to the underlying complaint, it must
file a declaratory judgment action and prove up those facts.32 Only upon a
judicial determination that the extrinsic facts eliminate the potential for

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 636.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 638.
Chandler, 702 N.E.2d at 640.
Id. at 638.

Id.
Id. at 640.
Clemmons, 430 N.E.2d 1104; Chandler,702 N.E.2d 634.
See Clemmons, 430 N.E.2d 1104; Chandler, 702 N.E.2d 634.
Id.
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indemnity coverage (e.g., by proving that an exclusion
applies), is the
33
insurer excused from continuing to defend its insured.
The facts in Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y v. Envirodyne Eng.
("Envirodyne")34 demonstrate how an insurer can correctly follow Illinois
law. In Envirodyne, the insured, Envirodyne, was engaged as a consulting
engineer at a construction site.35 Ben Guzman, who was working at the
site, alleged that he was injured due to violations of the Structural Work Act
and negligence attributable to Envirodyne.36 The complaint did not say
anything about the capacity in which Envirodyne was participating at the
site. The policy issued by Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York
("Fidelity") contained an exclusion, which would apply if Envirodyne's
work at the site consisted solely of "supervisory, inspection or engineering
services." 37 Although the complaint was silent, Fidelity believed that
Envirodyne was acting solely to provide "supervisory, inspection or
engineering services.
This exclusion would have to be proved, however,
by reference to facts extrinsic to the underlying complaint.39 Consequently,
Fidelity defended Envirodyne under a reservation of rights and promptly
filed a declaratory judgment action. 40 The Illinois Appellate Court allowed
Fidelity to prove its exclusion while the underlying action was still pending
and cut-off its duty to defend.41 Importantly, the court held that no conflict
was presented with the underlying case in allowing Fidelity to prove facts
relevant to its exclusion in the declaratory judgment action because the
facts pertinent to Envirodyne's capacity at the site were not at issue in the
underlying liability case.42 The judicial determination that the exclusion
applied ended the potential for indemnity coverage and therefore cut-off but did not retroactively eliminate - Fidelity's duty to defend.4 3
The reason for the cut-off rule discussed above has been wellexplained by the Illinois Supreme Court in Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark
33.
Id.
34.
461 N.E.2d 471 (I11.App. Ct. 1983).
35.
Id. at 472.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 474.
40.
EnvirodyneEng 'g., 461 N.E.2d at 472.
41.
Id. at 476.
42.
Id. at 476.
43.
There is no indication that Fidelity attempted to seek reimbursement of the
defense costs it already paid. Nor, of course, would any attempt have been successful since
the complaint allegations triggered Fidelity's duty to defend, which continued until the
judicial determination that there was no longer a potential for indemnity coverage. See also
Millers Mut. Ins. Ass'n of Ill. v. Ainsworth Seed Co. Inc., 552 N.E.2d 254 (I11.App. Ct.
1990) (holding that upon proof of facts establishing an exclusion, insurer was "released"
from its duty to defend).
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Indus.44 In deciding that an insurer could cut-off its duty to defend some
asbestos claims by exhausting its indemnity policy limits through payment
of other asbestos claims, the court brought clarity to the difference between
the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify and why the duty to defend is
considered to be broader than the duty to indemnify:
[A]n insurer's duty to defend and its duty to indemnify are
separate and distinct and . . . the former duty is broader
than the latter... The duty to indemnify arises only when
the insured becomes legally obligated to pay damages in
the underlying action that gives rise to a claim under the
policy. The duty to defend an action brought against the
insured, on the other hand, is determined solely by
reference to the allegations of the complaint. If the
complaint alleges facts which bring the claim within the
potential indemnity coverage of the policy, the insurer is
obligated to defend the action ... Thus, the insurer must
defend an action even though it may not ultimately be
obligated to indemnify the insured. Where the insurer has
exhausted its indemnity limits, however, the insurer cannot
ultimately be obligated to indemnify the insured. Thus, the
duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify only
when the insurer has the potential obligation to indemnify.
But, where, as here, the insurer has no potential obligation
to indemnify it has no duty to defend.4 5
In Associated Indem. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,46 the Illinois Appellate
Court applied the cut-off rule even in the somewhat harsh circumstance
where the insurer was prevented from obtaining a declaration cutting off its
duty to defend because the coverage issue it wanted to prove would have
caused a conflict with the underlying case by establishing liability facts not
yet addressed in the underlying case.47 In AssociatedIndemnity, the insured
struck a pedestrian with an automobile.4 8 The insured was either an agent
or an independent contractor of a business that transported vehicles long
distance. 49 The policy excluded coverage if he had an independent
contractor relationship with the owner of the vehicle.5 ° The pedestrian's
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

514 N.E.2d 150 (Ill. 1987).
Zurich, 514 N.E.2d at 163.
386 N.E.2d 529 (I1. App. Ct. 1979).
Id.
Id. at 532.
Id.
Id. at 534.
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complaint did not address the independent contractor issue and otherwise
came potentially within coverage." A declaratory judgment action was
brought before resolution of the underlying case, and the insurer sought to
demonstrate that the insured was in fact an independent contractor.5 2 The
court held that the independent contractor issue had to be decided in the
underlying case because the issue of whether the insured was an
independent contractor was contested in the underlying case.5 3 Hence, the
complaint came potentially within coverage and the insurer was prevented
from proving an exclusion to cut-off its duty to defend until the underlying
case was finally resolved. 4 The court described its application of the cutoff rule as follows:
We direct that INA [the insurer] reimburse Associated [the
insured's subrogee] for the defense costs Associated has
incurred in defending Blond [the insured] to date; the
amount of these expenses is to be determined by the trial
court below upon remand. We note that this obligation of
INA's is in no way dependent upon whether it is ultimately
found that INA's policy affords Blond coverage, and, more
particularly, whether it is determined that Blond was acting
as an agent or independent contractor at the time of the
accident.
We find that at the present time the underlying complaint
against Blond is still potentially within the coverage of
INA's insurance policy. Therefore, INA remains Blond's
primary insurer and is obligated to reimburse Blond for
future costs of his defense. If and when it is determined
with finality, in the underlying suit, that Blond was acting
as an independent contractor at the time of the accident,
Blond will be denied coverage under INA's policy, and
correspondingly, INA's duty to reimburse Blond for the
costs of his defense will end.55
5 6 the Illinois
In Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Markogiannakis,
Appellate
Court reaffirmed the cut-off rule in a case where - like Associated
Indemnity and Envirodyne - the facts pertinent to the insurer's defense did

51.

52.
53.

54.
55.
56.

Id.

AssociatedIndem., 386 N.E.2d at 535.
Id. at 544-45.

Id.
Id.

544 N.E.2d 1082 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
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not appear on the face of the underlying complaint. In Markogiannakis,the
insured, Stellios Markogiannakis, went to a condominium unit he owned to
collect rent from John Mason, who had been renting the unit from him for
three years.5 7 When leaving the apartment, Markogiannakis was called into
the condominium unit owned by Julia Crawley, an officer of the
condominium association.58 Markogiannakis and Crawley argued over
association fees owed by Markogiannakis, and at some point Crawley was
injured when she was knocked down either directly by Markogianakis or
by a door that he pushed. 59 Crawley filed a complaint against
Markogiannakis alleging that he either negligently or intentionally injured
her.60 The complaint said nothing about why Markogiannakis was in her
unit at the time of the injury or what they were discussing.6' The insurer,
Insurance Company of Illinois ("ICI") refused to defend because it learned
from some source other than Crawley's complaint that Markogiannakis was
at the condominium to collect rent and, subsequently, to discuss association
fees with Crawley. ICI claimed that a business pursuits exclusion applied.62
ICI filed a declaratory judgment action promptly but did not move for
summary judgment until after the underlying case was over and it had been
determined that Markogiannakis was liable on the basis of negligence but
not intentionally harmful conduct.63 Since the underlying case was
concluded, there was no question as to whether the court could consider
facts extrinsic to the underlying complaint in determining coverage. The
court considered the facts concerning why Markogiannakis was at the
condominium and determined that the business pursuits exclusion applied. 64
This ruling relieved ICI from paying the judgment against Markogiannakis,
but it did not relieve ICI from paying his defense costs. The court stated:
[W]e must look to Julia Crawley's complaint in the
underlying personal injury action to determine whether her
claim was potentially covered by the insured's
homeowner's policy at the time ICI was requested to tender
a defense. If the allegations of the complaint indicated
potential coverage, and no allegation clearly indicated noncoverage, ICI had a duty to defend, which must be satisfied
by reimbursing the insured for his costs in defending the
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1083.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1083-84.
Id. at 1084.
Markogiannakis,544 N.E.2d at 1085.
Id.
Id. at 1090.
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Crawley lawsuit. Count I of the Crawley complaint alleged
negligent conduct potentially covered under the policy. As
we have observed, nowhere in the complaint is there an
allegation or even a suggestion that Markogiannakis'
conduct took place in a business context or that the
encounter between the two parties was in any way related
to a business or rental activity of the insured. While it is
clear from the statements in ICI's denial letter that it had
knowledge, from another source, of the business context of
the altercation, this knowledge is of no consequence in
determining whether a duty to defend existed based on the
allegations of the complaint.65
Accordingly, the court held that ICI had to reimburse Markogiannakis
for his defense costs incurred in the underlying action.66
The above discussion demonstrates that Illinois courts, prior to the
Illinois Supreme Court decision in Midwest Sporting Goods,67 have already
clarified several points concerning when the duty to defend arises and when
it ends: (1) the duty to defend arises as soon as the potential for indemnity
coverage exists (i.e. when a complaint against the insured comes potentially
within coverage of the policy); 68 (2) the duty to defend is not negated by the
insurer's or the insured's knowledge of facts that prove non-coverage or
trigger an exclusion; 69 (3) an insurer must secure a judicial determination
that such facts eliminate the potential for indemnity coverage to cut-off its
duty to defend; 70 (4) the duty to defend continues from the time of the filing
of the lawsuit until the insurer obtains a judicial determination eliminating
the potential for indemnity coverage; 71 and (5) a judicial determination that
facts extrinsic to the underlying complaint eliminate the potential for
indemnity coverage does not retroactively eliminate the duty to defend.7
III.

CAN THE DUTY To DEFEND BE ELIMINATED RETROACTIVELY IN
AN EIGHT-CORNERS CASE?

What about an eight-corners case? An eight-corners case is one where
the sole question is whether the allegations of the complaint against the
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1095.
828 N.E.2d 1092 (Il1.2005).
Clemmons, 430 N.E.2d at 1108.
Chandler,702 N.E.2d at 638.
Clemmons, 430 N.E.2d at 1109.
Chandler,702 N.E.2d at 638-40.
Id. at 639.
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insured come potentially within the coverage of the insurance policy. 73 It is

a case where there is no question of whether facts extrinsic to the
underlying complaint prove non-coverage or trigger an exclusion. The
insurer and insured merely disagree as to whether the complaint allegations
create a potential for indemnity coverage. In this circumstance, the only
information at issue in determining whether there is a duty to defend is: (i)
the allegations found within the four-corners of the underlying complaint,
and (ii) the terms
and conditions found within the four-corners of the
74
insurance policy.

As noted above, the insurer must decide at the outset whether the
allegations of a complaint against its insured create a potential for
indemnity coverage and trigger its duty to defend.75 If the insurer has
doubts, it can file a declaratory judgment action and see if the court agrees
that there is no potential for indemnity coverage. But, what if the
declaratory judge does agree? Illinois law instructs the declaratory judge as
follows: "In order to determine whether the insurer's duty to defend has
arisen, the court must compare the allegations in the underlying complaint
to the policy language., 76 "If the underlying complaint alleges facts within
or potentially within policy coverage, an insurer is obligated to defend its
insured even if the allegations are groundless, false or fraudulent., 77 "The
allegations in the underlying complaint must be liberally construed in favor
of the insured., 78 This is the process for making ajudicial determinationas
to whether a duty to defend exists in an eight-comers case.
When a declaratory judge applies this process in an eight-corners case
and determines that there is no duty to defend, does that mean that there
never was a duty to defend, or in other words, that there never was a
potential for indemnity coverage? Most insurers would probably argue that
this is the case - that when they obtain a declaration in a four-comers case
that there is no duty to defend, the declaration means that there never was
any potential for coverage, and consequently, that they had no obligation to
pay defense costs between the time the underlying complaint was filed
against their insured and the time when the declaratory court issued a
73.
The concept of the eight-comers case is often utilized by Illinois courts in
describing a process for determining whether there is a duty to defend in the context of a
declaratory judgment action. Although some courts call it the "four-comers" case (or rule),
reference to the "eight-comers" case is more appropriate because courts consider the comers
of both the insurance policy and the underlying complaint. See Pekin Ins. Co. v. Fid. &
Guar. Ins. Co., 830 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
74.
Pekin Ins. Co. v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 830 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
75. Clemmons, 430 N.E.2d at 1108.
76.
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1220 (Ill.

1992).

77.
78.

Wilkin, 578 N.E.2d at 930.
OutboardMarine, 607 N.E.2d at 1220 (citing Wilkin, 578 N.E.2d at 930).
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judgment. This view endorses the idea that, in an eight-comers case, the
question of whether an insurer has a duty to defend at the time a complaint
is filed against its insured can be determined retroactively by referencing
the result of a declaratory judgment action.
The best argument in favor of the retroactive view is that the
declaratory judge is merely following the same process that an insurer is
supposed to follow at the outset in determining whether a duty to defend
exists. Hence, if the declaratory judge agrees with the insurer, it is ratifying
the insurer's initial determination that no duty to defend ever existed.
However, the retroactive view is incorrect. It has never been held by an
Illinois court to be the law. It ignores the fact that construction and
application of insurance policy terms is a judicial function, the result of
which is continually in doubt until a court actually rules, and it leads to the
absurd result that an insurer can "honor" its duty to defend by subjecting its
insured to a two-front war.
The better view, and the one adopted by Midwest Sporting Goods as
the law of Illinois, is that when an insurer is in doubt enough about
coverage to file a declaratory judgment action, even in an eight-comers
case, a potential for indemnity coverage - and hence a duty to defend Moreover, that duty to defend cannot be extinguished
exists.7 9
retroactively based on the result of the declaratory judgment action.80 In an
eight-comers case, the duty to defend is triggered when the underlying
complaint is filed against the insured and the insurer has a question about
whether the policy coverage applies to the factual allegations contained in
the complaint. 81 The function of the declaratory judgment action is to
obtain a judicial construction of the insurance policy terms as applied to the
factual allegations to eliminate or affirm the potential for coverage that
exists due to the possibility that the judicial construction issue could be
decided in favor of coverage.82 The result is the same as in the extrinsic fact
cases. The judicial act of issuing a declaration concerning policy
construction and application resolves the uncertainty existing before the
declaration and either eliminates or affirms the potential for coverage. If
coverage is affirmed, it is clear that there always was a potential for
coverage, and hence, a duty to defend. If the declaration eliminates the
potential for coverage, then the insurer's duty to defend is cut off- it is not
retroactively eliminated.83

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Midwest SportingGoods Co., 828 N.E.2d at 1092.
Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Id. at 1104.
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The adoption of this view in Midwest Sporting Goods was
foreshadowed in the Markogiannakis case.
As noted above,
Markogiannakis was an extrinsic facts case, which held that the insurer's
proof of facts extrinsic to the underlying complaint merely cut off - but did
not retroactively eliminate - the insurer's duty to defend.84 However, the
Markogiannakiscourt also clearly indicated that it believed the result would
be the same even if the coverage-defeating facts appeared on the face of the
underlying complaint:
[E]ven if Markogiannakis' purpose in going to Crawley's
building in order to collect rent and/or Crawley's inquiries
about the condominium association fees had been stated or
indicated on the face of the complaint, the well-recognized
ambiguity of the "ordinarily incident to non-business
pursuits" clause in homeowner's policies would have had to
be considered in determining whether it was clearly
apparent that her personal injury claim was beyond policy
coverage. Because of the necessity for a judicial
construction of this clause, in this and similar cases, the
applicability of the "business pursuits" exclusion would not
have been clear and free from doubt at the time ICI was
requested to defend the case. 85
Hence, the Markogiannakiscourt rejected the retroactivity rule in the
eight-comers context. It stated, albeit in dicta, that the need for a judicial
construction of policy language creates enough uncertainty as to whether
the policy terms will apply to the factual allegations against the insured that
the potential for indemnity coverage, and thus the duty to defend, exists
until a coverage-defeating judicial construction is obtained by the insurer. 86
IV.

MIDWEST SPORTING GOODS

This brings us to the Midwest Sporting Goods case. Midwest Sporting
Goods was an eight-comers case.87 There was never a question as to
whether facts extrinsic to the underlying complaint could prove noncoverage or trigger an exclusion. The sole duty to defend question was

84. Markogiannakis,544 N.E.2d 1082.
85.
Id. at 1094 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant Midwest Sporting Goods Co., General Agents
Ins. Co. of America, Inc. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 765 N.E.2d 1152 (Il. App. Ct.
2002) (No. 1-01-1519).
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whether the factual allegations in the complaint
88 created the potential for
indemnity coverage under the insurance policy.

The facts of the underlying case are an important part of Chicago
history. As part of Mayer Daley's campaign to reduce gun violence in
Chicago, the City of Chicago and Cook County brought suit against a
number of gun manufacturers and distributors, including Midwest Sporting
Goods ("Midwest"), seeking damages for injuries to citizens due to gun
violence in Chicago and seeking injunctions to stop the alleged dangerous
conduct of the defendants. 89 The complaint alleged that Midwest and
others negligently entrusted guns to suspect purchasers and created a public
nuisance by such actions. 90 A sample of the alleged conduct involved
follows:
The city and the county alleged in the complaint that during
1998 undercover police officers went to Midwest's store in
Cook County to test the measures Midwest took to prevent
guns from getting into criminal hands.
One officer
purchased a[n] Uzi. According to the complaint: "The sales
clerk said that since they could not legally deliver the Uzi
to him in Cook County, they would have to write up the
purchase order on the forms of the Midwest Sporting
Goods' Downers Grove store, and he would have to pick up
the firearm at the Downers Grove store. The sales clerk
used a blank purchase order with the Downers Grove
masthead, and he called the Downers Grove store and
asked them to call in his FOID [firearm owners
identification card] number. When Officer 1 said that he
wanted to purchase a pistol barrel for the Uzi, the sales
clerk told him that since it was illegal to put the pistol
barrel on the Uzi, he should write up the pistol barrel as a
separate purchase from Midwest's Lyons store (the one he
was in at the time) rather than the Downers Grove store
from which he was technically buying the Uzi. The sales
clerk also advised Officer 1 that he should have all of the
purchases written up on separate orders so as to avoid ATF
[United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms]
scrutiny." When the officer picked up the Uzi in Downers
88.
Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 765 N.E.2d at 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
89.
The appellate court described the relief sought as follows: "The city and the
county seek injunctions and damages, including costs of emergency medical services and the
'Bureau of Health's costs to treat victims of firearms violence,' estimated to exceed
$50,000,000 for the period from 1994 through 1998." Id. at 1155.
90.
Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 765 N.E.2d at 1154.
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Grove, a Midwest employee advised him "to put the Uzi in
his trunk, because he would be arrested if caught with it in
Cook County." The same officer purchased six other guns
at Midwest between September 30 and October 24, 1998. 91
The insurance policies at issue agreed to defend Midwest against
claims for bodily injury caused by an "occurrence," defined as "an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
harmful conditions. 9 The policies also included an expected or intended
injury exclusion.93 After construing the policy terms and reviewing the
facts necessary to prove causes of action for negligent entrustment and
public nuisance, the court determined that the expected or intended injury
exclusion did not apply, but the pattern of alleged conduct and the conduct
necessary to prove the identified causes of action could not fairly be
9 4 Consequently,
described as "accidents.
the court held that there was no
95
duty to defend.
Thus, in an eight-corners case, the court compared the allegations of
the underlying complaint to the insurance policy terms and made a judicial
determination that the insurer did not have a duty to defend.96 An important
question remained, however. The insurer, General Agents Ins. Co. of
America, Inc. ("General Agents"), had agreed to defend Midwest under a
reservation of rights while General Agents pursued its declaratory judgment
action seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend.97 The reservation
of rights letter included a reservation to seek reimbursement of any defense
costs paid in the event a court determined that it did not have a duty to
defend.98 Up to the point in time where the appellate court affirmed that it
had no duty to defend, General Agents had paid approximately $40,000
towards Midwest's defense. 99 On the theory that the appellate court's
ruling meant that it never had a duty to defend, General Agents filed a
motion in the trial court seeking reimbursement of the $40,000. 100 The trial
1 02
court agreed.'0 ° Midwest then appealed that decision.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.at 1155.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 1159.
95.
Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 765 N.E.2d at 1160.
96.
Id.
97.
Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d
1092, 1094 (1112005).
98.
Id. at 1094.
99.
Id. at 1095.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
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The appellate court fundamentally agreed with General Agents and
adopted the retrospective rule. 10 3 General Agents argued before the
appellate court that because its prior opinion determined that there was no
duty to defend, then there never was a duty to defend and Midwest would
be unjustly enriched if it were allowed to retain the $40,000.104 Midwest
argued before the appellate court that General Agents' defense costs
payments were made pursuant to the insurance contracts and that since the
insurance contracts governed their relationship - and did not include a
provision allowing for reimbursement of defense costs - the theory of
unjust enrichment was inapplicable.' 0 5 The appellate court held as follows:
Contrary to Midwest's central assertion, we find that
Gainsco [General Agents] did not make the payment3 to
Midwest's counsel pursuant to the insurance contract.
Instead, Gainsco made these payments as an
accommodation pending litigation to determine whether
Gainsco owed Midwest, under the insurance contract, a
defense to the City of Chicago's lawsuit. Midwest accepted
the conditions Gainsco placed on the accommodation by
accepting the checks it received. Just as our supreme court
enforced the terms of the accommodation the parties made
in McKechney, we find the accommodation here
enforceable.
The trial court properly enforced the
accommodation by ordering Midwest to reimburse Gainsco
the amount Gainsco paid for defense against claims not
covered by Gainsco's policy. 106
Consequently, because the appellate court adopted the retrospective
rule, it believed that there was no applicable contract governing General
Agents' payment of defense costs or whether General Agents was entitled
to seek reimbursement of those defense costs. 0 7 Given that view, the
appellate court supplied a rule of decision based on fairness. General
Agents was basically doing a favor for Midwest by funding its defense until
the declaratory judgment action ran its course, and, because General Agents
offered that accommodation on the condition that it would be entitled to be
reimbursed if it won the declaratory
judgment action, it was only fair that
08
condition.
the
enforce
the court
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 812 N.E.2d at 621.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 624.
Id.
See id.
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The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the fundamental premise of
the retrospective rule and reversed the appellate court, holding that in fact
General Agents' defense costs payment were made pursuant to its duty to
defend under the insurance contracts. 0 9 The Illinois Supreme Court set out
the parties' arguments in detail, and specifically noted that the key
difference between the parties was whether General Agents' payment of
defense costs and alleged right to reimbursement were governed by a
contract (i.e. the insurance policy) or not." 0 The court then stated as
follows:
Gainsco argues that we need not look to the insurance
contract between the parties to determine whether Gainsco
had a right to reimbursement because the circuit and
appellate courts have already determined that Gainsco
owed no duty to defend. Gainsco maintains that because it
had no duty to defend, it follows that there is no contract
governing the relationship between the parties.
The
problem with this argument is that Gainsco is attemptingto
define its duty to defend based upon the outcome of the
declaratoryjudgmentaction. Although an insurer's duty to
indemnify arises only after damages are fixed, the duty to
defend arises as soon as damages are sought.' 1
Hence, the Illinois Supreme Court clearly rejected the retrospective
rule in this eight-corners case." 2 The court focused on the fact that General
Agents had some uncertainty about whether it had a duty to defend." 3 That
uncertainty related to whether the policy provisions covered alleged
conduct that could be characterized as intentional or willful - precisely the
issue on which the appellate court's decision concerning General Agents'
duty to defend later turned." 4 General Agents' duty to defend therefore
arose at the time the city and county filed their suit against Midwest
because the complaint against Midwest alleged facts that might or might
not have been covered, depending on how a court would ultimately
construe certain policy terms and apply them to the alleged facts." 5 Thus,
the court accepted the dicta in Markogiannakis"16 that, in an eight-comers
case, a complaint can come potentially within indemnity coverage because
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d at 1104.
Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1103 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1104.
See id. at 1095-96.
Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d at 1103.
Markogiannakis,544 N.E.2d at 1094.
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there is uncertainty about how the policy provisions will be construed and
applied to the alleged facts by a court." 7
The Illinois Supreme Court was also clear about giving guidance to
lower courts as to what an insurance company should do when it is
uncertain as its duty to defend." 8 Quoting a Wyoming Federal District
Court with approval, the court stated:
The question as to whether there is a duty to defend an
insured is a difficult one, but because that is the business of
an insurance carrier, it is the insurance carrier's duty to
make that decision. If an insurance carrierbelieves that no
coverage exists, then it should deny its insured a defense at
the beginning instead of defending and later attempting to
recoup from its insured the costs of defending the
underlying action.
Where the insurance carrier is
uncertain over insurance coverage for the underlying
claim, the proper course is for the insurance carrier to
tender a defense and seek a declaratoryjudgment as to
coverage under the policy. However, to allow the insurer
to force the insured into choosing between seeking a
defense under the policy, and run the potential risk of
having to pay for this defense if it is subsequently
determined that no duty to defend existed, or giving up all
meritorious claims that a duty to defend exists, places the
insured in the position of making a Hobson's choice.' 1 9
Notably, the Illinois Supreme Court does not suggest that it is an
option for the insurer to refuse to defend the insured and drag the insured
into court as a proper way to honor its duty to defend.120 If the insurer is
uncertain enough about coverage to file a declaratory judgment action, its
duty to defend has been triggered and it should pay the insured's
defense
21
uncertainty.
the
out
sorts
court
declaratory
costs while the
Having rejected the retrospective rule, the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted the cut-off rule. That is, where the insurer is uncertain enough as
to its duty to defend to file a declaratory judgment action, its duty to defend

117.
Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d at 1104.
118.
Id. at 1102.
119.
Id. (quoting Am. States Ins. Co. v. Ridco, Inc., Civ. No. 95CV158D (D. Wyo.
1999)) (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121.
Id. at 1104.
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arises and continues until the declaratory judge issues a decision finding
that there is no coverage. 122 The court applied the cut-off rule as follows:
Although Gainsco implies that it has always maintained
that it did not owe Midwest a defense in the underlying
matter, we note that Gainsco's reservation of rights letter
reveals some uncertainty concerning coverage.
With
regard to allegations in the underlying claim that Midwest
was liable to the plaintiffs for various acts of intentional
and/or willful conduct, Gainsco's reservation of rights letter
stated that "the claim may not be covered under the Policy."
Given this uncertainty, Gainsco correctly agreed to pay
Midwest's defense costs in the underlying action and sought
a declaratory judgment that it did not owe Midwest a
defense. Gainsco thus remained obligated to defend
Midwest as long as any questions remained concerning
whether the underlying claims were covered by the
policies. Because Gainsco's obligation to defend continued
until the trial court found that Gainsco did not owe
Midwest a defense, Gainsco is not entitled to
reimbursement of defense costs paid pending the trial
court's order in the declaratory judgment action. The fact
that the trial court ultimately found that the underlying
claims against Midwest were not covered by the Gainsco
policies does not
entitle Gainsco to reimbursement of its
23
1
costs.
defense
To summarize, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Midwest
Sporting Goods brings clarity to the following issues in an eight-comers
case: (1) the supreme court rejected the retrospective rule and held that an
insurer must make a decision as to whether it will defend or not at the time
it is presented with a complaint against the insured; 124 (2) any uncertainty,
even as to how policy terms will be construed and applied to alleged facts,
creates a potential for coverage and triggers the duty to defend; 125 (3) if the
insurer files a declaratory judgment action to eliminate the uncertainty, it
must pay the insured's defense costs while the declaratory judge sorts out
the coverage issues;1 26 (4) if the insurer obtains a declaration in its favor, it
122.
123.
added).
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d at 1104 (second and third emphases
See id.
Id.
Id.
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will not be entitled to recover defense costs already paid 127 as a judgment in
the insurer's favor merely cuts off its duty to defend; 128 and (5) the insurer
cannot reserve the right to be reimbursed for paying defense costs while a
declaratory judgment action is pending because it does not have that right in
the first place. 2 9 It pays defense costs because the policy obligates it to do
SO. 130

V.

KEY IMPLICATION OF MIDWEST SPOR TING GOODS -

THE END OF THE TwO-FRONT WAR

Midwest Sporting Goods puts an end to the two-front war. Now, when
an insurer files a declaratory judgment action, it indicates its uncertainty by
the very act of seeking judicial guidance.' 31 And this is true regardless of
whether the coverage question relates to facts extrinsic to the underlying
complaint (an extrinsic facts case) or the need to obtain a judicial
construction and application of policy terms to alleged facts (an eightcornmers case). 132 Consequently, the insurer must pay the insured's defense
costs while it pursues a declaration of non-coverage.133 This eliminates the
two-front war because the insured never has to fight two lawsuits with its
own money. Even if the insurer wins its declaratory judgment action, the
insured will have paid only one set of attorneys at each point in time.
During the declaratory judgment action, the insurer pays the attorneys
defending the underlying action and the insured pays only its coverage
attorneys. If the insurer wins, the insured picks up paying for defense of the
underlying case, but the coverage action is over.
Permitting a two-front war allows for abuse. If an insurer is permitted
to refuse to defend and file a declaratory judgment action against its
insured, it could do so in every case, regardless of whether it is uncertain
about its obligations. Thus, even in cases where there is clearly potential
coverage and the insurer has a duty to defend, it could refuse to defend and
file a declaratory judgment action. If the insured has enough money to fight
the declaratory judgment suit and obtains good counsel, some day (maybe
years later), the court will rule in its favor and make the insurer pay past
defense costs. However, in many cases, either the insured will not have
sufficient financial resources to fight the two-front war (keep in mind that
the insured has to defend itself while fighting its insurer) or the insured will
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d at 1104.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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settle cheaply because the cost of the two-front war outweighs the benefit of
winning it (e.g. in relatively small underlying cases, it is often more cost
effective to forget about insurance since it is so expensive to enforce
coverage in a two-front war circumstance).
The Midwest Sporting Goods rule creates a strong set of incentives for
an insurer to act in good faith towards its insured. First, since bringing a
declaratory judgment action against an insured automatically means that the
insurer will have to pay defense costs in the underlying case,' 3 4 insurers will
think twice about suing their insureds except in cases where their coverage
defenses are strong. Second, insurers' incentive to drag out expensive
declaratory judgment actions will be reduced because they have to keep
paying underlying defense costs until they obtain a favorable resolution.135
And third, the option of using the two-front war as an economic hammer to
force insureds to settle claims cheaply will be eliminated. Hence, the
incidence of weak declaratory judgment suits will be reduced, such actions
will be decided more quickly and efficiently, and claims will be settled
more fairly.
VI.

Is THERE STILL ROOM AFTER MIDWEST TO ARGUE FOR THE TwoFRONT WAR?

I do not think so, but one can anticipate the sorts of arguments insurers
will make to try to save the two-front war tactic.
A.

FLATLY DENYING ALL CLAIMS WILL NOT WORK

Insurers may focus on the Illinois Supreme Court's discussion
concerning General Agents' uncertainty about coverage and try to read it
narrowly.1 36 The court focused on the fact that General Agents in its
reservation of rights letters said only that the alleged intentional or willful
conduct of Midwest "may" not be covered by the policy. 13 7 Hence, insurers
134.
See id.
135.
Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d at 1104.
136.
Id.
137.
Interestingly, while the court focused on General Agents' uncertainty (use of the
word "may") with respect to intentional or willful conduct, it earlier quoted General Agents'
reservation of rights letter that indicated no uncertainty as to lack of coverage because the
city and county complaint sought only economic damages: "The policy only applies to
damages because of property damage or bodily injury caused by an occurrence. The First
Amended Complaint does not seek damages because of property damages or bodily injury.
As such, the claim is not covered under the Policy." Id. at 1094 (emphasis added). This was
in fact the basis of the trial court's ruling (i.e. that the damages sought were solely economic
damages and not damages for bodily injury or property damage). Id. at 1095. Yet, the court
still applied the cut-off rule. The only conclusion is that the fundamental basis of the court's
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may reason that as long as they use stronger denial language, courts will not
perceive any uncertainty by them as to coverage. They then will be free to
file declaratory judgment actions in every case they choose and not pay
defense costs. And, this will work even if insurers are uncertain about
coverage - as long as they say they are certain there is no coverage in their
letters to insureds.
One objection to this work-around is that it suggests that the Illinois
Supreme Court intended to promote dishonest denials of coverage by
insurers. That seems unlikely. More fundamentally, however, why would
an insurer file a declaratory judgment action if it was certain that it had no
duty to defend? Declaratory judgment actions are expensive for insurers
too. If an insurer is certain that there is no coverage, it has the option of
flatly denying coverage and taking the chance that it is wrong and estopped
from raising defenses to indemnity coverage, as in Clemmons 38 and
Chandler.139 The fear of estoppel may be an incentive to file a declaratory
judgment action when an insurer has the slightest doubt about its coverage
position - but the slightest doubt is all it takes to trigger the insurers' duty
to defend!140 Hence, the fact that an insurer files a declaratory judgment
action is dispositive as to the existence of its uncertainty concerning its
coverage position. Moreover, making the filing of a declaratory judgment
action a bright-line rule as to uncertainty will promote respect for the rules
set forth in Midwest Sporting Goods rather than creative work-around
tactics.
B.

MIDWEST SPORTING GOODS CANNOT BE LIMITED TO
REIMBURSEMENT CASES

Midwest Sporting Goods was a reimbursement case.141 General
Agents "correctly" defended under a reservation of rights and promptly
brought its coverage action. 42 We know from that case that an insurer who
follows that route will not be entitled to reimbursement of the defense costs
paid. 143 Or, in other words, the result will be that the insurer pays the
defense costs of the insured while the insurers' declaratory judgment action
finding of uncertainty on the part of General Agents is the fact that General Agents was
uncertain enough about its coverage position that it felt compelled to file a declaratory
judgment action rather than just flatly deny coverage and take its chances that it would later
be estopped to deny indemnity coverage as in Clemmons and Chandler.
138.
Clemmons, 430 N.E.2d 1104.
139.
Chandler, 702 N.E.2d 634.
140.
Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d at 1104.
141.
Id. at 1093.
142.
Id. at 1094.
143.
Id. at 1104.
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is pending. 144 And, even if the insurer wins the declaratory145judgment
action, it will not be entitled to recover the defense costs it paid.
Can an insurer get around this result by refusing to pay defense costs
while its declaratory judgment action is pending? Insurers will argue that
the Illinois Supreme Court decided in 1999 that, when faced with
uncertainty as to coverage, they had two options: (1) defend under a
reservation of rights, or (2) promptly file a declaratory judgment action
seeking judicial guidance. 146 Moreover, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Martin, also held that these options are independent alternatives, meaning
that insurers can follow Illinois law by choosing either option.' 47 Insurers
will question:
how can the rule in Martin be consistent with an
interpretation of Midwest Sporting Goods that says insurers must pay
defense costs while pursuing a declaratory judgment action?
While this argument has some surface appeal, it is incorrect. The
Martin case was dealing solely with the estoppel rule discussed earlier in
connection with the Clemmons148 and Chandler149 cases. 150 There was no
question in Martin as to whether State Farm had to pay the insured's
defense costs because, having been abandoned by State Farm, the insured
(who was in jail for arson) allowed the underlying case to proceed to a
default judgment.1 51 There were no defense costs. 15 2 Martin was solely
about whether State Farm was estopped from raising defenses to indemnity
coverage because it had not "secured" a declaration of non-coverage prior
to resolution of the underlying case. 153 Martin, in fact, stands for the
proposition that by either filing a declaratory judgment action or defending
under a reservation of rights, an insurer uncertain about its duty to defend
can avoid estoppel, especially in default cases like Martin. 54 However,
pursuant to Midwest Sporting Goods, once the insurer files its declaratory
judgment action, if the insured is defending itself, the insurer will be subject
to a motion to pay the insureds defense costs while the declaratory action is
pending. 55 There is no inconsistency between the rules set forth in Martin
and those set forth in Midwest Sporting Goods.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Martin, 710 N.E.2d at 1231.
Id. at 1232.
Clemmons, 430 N.E.2d 1104.
Chandler,702 N.E.2d 634.
Martin, 710 N.E.2d at 1230.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1232.
Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d at 1104.
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In addition, given the result in Midwest Sporting Goods, it would be
absurd to allow insurers to avoid paying defense costs while their
declaratory judgment action is pending. After Midwest Sporting Goods, it
is unquestionably the law of Illinois that the insurer who defends under a
reservation of rights while simultaneously pursuing a declaratory judgment
action will not be able to recover those defense expenses. 156 Such an
insurer has followed a path of good faith in protecting its insured while
seeking guidance from the court to clear up uncertainty over coverage
issues. Given this state of the law, it hardly makes sense to reward the
insurer who acts in bad faith by abandoning its insured while
simultaneously suing it. If insurers successfully convince Illinois courts to
restrict Midwest Sporting Goods to reimbursement cases, there would be no
more reimbursement cases because insurers would be strongly discouraged
from defending under a reservation of rights while pursuing a declaratory
judgment action. Such a rule would promote bad faith denials of coverage
by insurers and create incentives to abandon - rather than protect insureds.
C.

RECENT APPLICATION IN THE ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT - SECOND

DISTRICT

Recently, one panel of the Illinois Appellate Court - Second District
correctly applied Midwest Sporting Goods in determining whether an
insurer who lost in the trial court had to advance defense costs while its
appeal was pending.' 57 When the trial court ruled in favor of the insured, it
ordered the insurer to post a bond for defense costs already incurred and
required the insurer to advance defense costs. 158 Relying on Martin, the
insurer argued that it had fulfilled the requirements of law by filing a
declaratory judgment action, and that it need not also pay the insured's
defense costs while that declaratory judgment action proceeded to a
conclusion. 159 The appellate court disagreed and, citing Midwest Sporting
Goods, held that the insurer was required to post the bond and advance
costs through conclusion of the appeal. 160 The appellate court also noted
that the insurer would not be able to recover those defense costs if it won
the appeal. 161

156.
Id.
157.
See Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Swiderski Electronics, Inc., 834 N.E.2d 562 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005), cert. granted,844 N.E.2d 972 (II1.2006).
158.
Swiderski Electronics,834 N.E.2d at 566.
159.
Id. at 576.
160.
Id. at 577.
161.
Id. at 577 n.3.
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Another panel of the Illinois Appellate Court - Second District
subsequently incorrectly applied Midwest Sporting Goods in a rescission
case. 62 Before any claim had been brought, the insurer had filed an action
for rescission of an errors and omissions liability policy against the insured
brokers asserting that the brokers had made material misrepresentations in
securing the policy. 163 While the rescission action was pending, 64a
construction company client sued the brokers for negligence and fraud.
The insurer denied coverage and amended its rescission action to include
additional bases for refusing to cover the construction company suit. 165 The
trial court stayed the amended rescission suit because it involved issues that
were also involved in the underlying construction company suit. 166 The
brokers then asked the trial court to order the insurer to pay their defense
company suit until such time as the rescission case
costs in the construction
67
1
decided.
be
could
Incorrectly relying on Martin, the appellate court held in Professional
Underwriters that the insurer had honored its duty to defend by filing 68a
declaratory judgment action and need not also pay defense costs.1
Somehow this panel of the appellate court missed the fact that Martin did
not involve defense costs and made no ruling whatever about the duty to
pay defense costs while a coverage action is pending. The appellate court
stated:
Defendants attempt to distinguish the rule in Martin by
noting that there the supreme court addressed only the issue
of whether the insurer was estopped from later denying
coverage to the insured because it had filed a declaration
that it owed no coverage instead of defending the insured
under a reservation of rights. Defendants correctly recite
part of the holding in Martin, but they overlook its holding
that an insurer may opt to file a declaratory judgment
action instead of defending the insured and thus suspend
the duty to defend pending the resolution of the declaratory
judgment action."'

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See Prof'l UnderwritersAgency, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 597.
Id. at 598-99.
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id. at 600.
See id.
Prof'l UnderwritersAgency, Inc., 848 N.E.2d at 604.
Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
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Martin made no such ruling - not even in dicta. 170 As noted above,
Martin (a default judgment case) did not involve defense costs.' 7 1 Martin
stands for the proposition that an insurer can avoid estoppel as to paying
any judgment or settlement by filing a prompt declaratory action and not
paying defense costs. 172 The appellate court's statement in Professional
Underwriters that Martin held the filing of a declaratory judgment action
"suspends the duty to defend" is simply incorrect. Martin never said any
such thing. 173 And, of course, this conclusion is flatly contrary to the
express holding of Midwest Sporting Goods, which did deal with the issue
of whether an insurer is obligated to pay defense costs pending resolution of
a timely filed declaratory judgment action. 174 The appellate court curtly
dismissed Midwest Sporting Goods as 1a75 reimbursement case that had
nothing to do with the issue it was facing.
. It may be that the appellate court in Professional Underwriters was
motivated by the fact that the insurer had an already pending rescission
action prior to the construction company suit being brought.' 76 It may have
had in mind that a defense of rescission, which could result in a ruling that
the policy was void ab initio, is somehow different from asserting policy
defenses or non-coverage and supports a special rule. 177 It did not,
however, take that approach. 78 Rather, it equated the rescission defense
with any other defense and ruled based on its incorrect interpretations of
Martin and Midwest Sporting Goods.179 Having departed so dramatically
from the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in Midwest Sporting Goods, 80 the
Second District's opinion in Professional Underwriters should not be
followed in future cases.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Midwest Sporting Goods case brings much needed clarity to the
thorny area of law concerning an insurer's duty to defend. Now, when an
insurer is presented with a complaint against its insured and is uncertain
about coverage, the rules are simple and straightforward: it must: (i) defend
its policyholder under a reservation of rights; (ii) file a declaratory
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See Martin, 710 N.E.2d 1228.
Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1232.
See id.
Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d at 1104.
Profl UnderwritersAgency, Inc., 848 N.E.2d at 602.
Id. at 598-99.
See id. at 598-99.
Profl UnderwritersAgency, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 597.
See id.
Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828 N.E.2d at 1104.
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judgment action seeking a judgment that it has no duty defend AND pay the
policyholder's defense costs until a judgment is obtained; or (iii) refuse to
defend and take its chances that it will be estopped from raising policy
defenses to any judgment or settlement if it is wrong.
In the event an insurer attempts to launch a two-front war, the insured
now has a remedy. It can file a motion in the trial court requesting that the
insurer pay its defense costs in the underlying case until the coverage issues
raised in the declaratory judgment action are resolved. In light of the
Illinois Supreme Court's ruling in Midwest Sporting Goods, that motion
should be routinely granted.

